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Abstract  
This article shows how both employers and the state have influenced macro-level 
processes and structures concerning the content and transposition of the European 
Union (EU) Employee Information and Consultation (I&C) Directive. It argues that 
the processes of regulation occupied by employers reinforce a voluntarism which 
marginalizes rather than shares decision-making power with workers. The 
contribution advances the conceptual lens of ‘regulatory space’ by building on 
Lukes’ multiple faces of power to better understand how employment regulation is 
determined across transnational, national and enterprise levels. The research 
proposes an integrated analytical framework on which ‘occupancy’ of regulatory 
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The European Information and Consultation (I&C) Directive (2002/14/EC) was 
introduced to promote social dialogue and elements of shared decision-making. 
The Directive required member states to introduce permanent arrangements so 
managers would support dialogue at workplace level in three broad areas: i) 
provide ‘information’ pertaining to the economic situation of the company; ii) 
enable ‘information and consultation’ concerning developments or threats to 
employment; and iii), ‘inform and consult employees, with a view to reaching 
agreement’, on decisions likely to lead to changes in work organisation or 
contractual arrangements. One main disincentive in the UK and Irish context is that 
employees have to ‘trigger’ the right and request an information and consultation 
forum, which may actually discourage voice and participation (Wilkinson et al., 
2007; Hall, 2010). There was a perception that the Directive was introduced with 
specifically the UK and Ireland in mind, given they were the only two EU member 
states at the time lacking generalized employee voice legislation (Hall et al., 2011).  
 
The research in this article addresses the policy determination and transposition of 
the I&C Directive within liberal market economies (LMEs). It asks what impact the  
Directive has had in encouraging employers to share decision-making powers with 
employees (unions) through new or revised consultation mechanisms. Existing 
evidence reports that the transposition of I&C regulations favour direct 
communications rather than collective systems of worker voice, as the original 
Directive proposed (Hall et al., 2011). The contribution in this article, however, is to 
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show how actors dominated the regulatory space for I&C regulation by integrating 
and linking both macro and micro contexts. The evidence illustrates how employer 
tactics for ‘neo-voluntarism’ and the politics of 'common knowledge formation’ 
(Culpepper, 2008) shaped the parameters on which statutory rights are formulated 
and enacted across different governance levels. In short, macro-level regulation 
reinforces, ironically, a micro-level voluntarist dynamic by legitimising subjective 
meanings among social actors as objective fact. The I&C regulations did not 
prompt a new politic of common knowledge formation around shared social 
dialogue diffused from the macro policy to micro workplace level. The research 
further adds to knowledge by integrating Lukes three ‘faces’ of power (1974, 2005) 
to the concept of regulatory space. In so doing the article advances a multi-level, 
multi-dimensional analytical framework on which ‘occupancy’ of regulatory space 
can be evaluated in comparative national contexts.  
 
The article is structured as follows. Next, the concepts of ‘regulatory space’ and 
Lukes ‘faces of power’ are discussed, leading to a simplified schematic theoretical 
integration. Section three briefly informs the reader about the content of the I&C 
Directive and the issue of ‘light touch’ legalism. This is followed by an outline of the 
research methods. The evidence is presented in section five by integrating macro-
level data concerning employer and government responses to influence the 
‘content’ and ‘transposition’ of the I&C Directive. Subsequent linkages with micro-
level evidence shows how Lukes’s faces of power translate to workplace practices 





2. Integrating ‘regulatory space’ and Lukes dimensions of power   
‘Regulatory space’ has been advanced as an important analytical tool for assessing 
the impact of employment regulation (Crouch, 1985; Hancher and Moran, 1989; 
Martínez-Lucio and MacKenzie, 2004; Scott, 2001). Regulatory space can be 
defined as: ‘the range of regulatory issues subject to public decision. Proponents 
claim that its dimensions and occupants can be understood by examining 
regulation in any particular national setting, and by analyzing that setting in terms 
of its specific political, legal and cultural attributes’ (Berg et al., 2005:73).  
 
A number of theoretical issues are important. First, space, by definition, is open for 
occupation. The extent to which actors concerned with work and employment can 
occupy regulatory space heavily depends on their ability to mobilise resources and 
their capacity to prevent others from occupying the same resources (Edwards and 
Wajcman, 2005:118). To this end possession of positional power resources are 
central to processes of occupation (Lukes, 1974, 2005). Power resources connect 
to what MacKenzie and Martinez-Lucio (2005) refer to as ‘shifting regulatory 
processes’. Thus employment actors seek to influence labour market outcomes by 
virtue of ‘positional power’, in which a sense (or discourse) of legitimacy is 
afforded to dominant groups to alter the rules of the game, rather than assuming 
some simple or overarching deregulatory trajectory based on government politics 
alone. Allen (2004) suggests that boundaries upon which regulation is contested at 
micro-level are shaped by multiple sources of influence at higher levels, stressing 




A second theoretical issue is that space can be unequally distributed, with actors 
mobilising resources to either advance or retreat their frontier of control (Goodrich, 
1975). For example, employers and their representative associations are exemplars 
of institutions that colonize regulatory space for voice, while trade union power 
recedes (Hancher and Moran, 1989). Third, power resources influencing 
employment regulations can be institutionally conditioned, depending on national 
or enterprise level circumstances. The concept of regulatory space is therefore 
both multi-level and multi-dimensional, with vertical and horizontal governance 
factors shaping actor capacity to mobilise power resources to occupy space at 
different levels. MacKenzie and Martinez-Lucio (2005) show that factors affecting 
change at one level, say the workplace, are better understood by assessing 
complex interactions across multiple spheres in which employment actors interact,  
for example across national and even transnational levels. Implications relate to, 
for example, union federations and employer associations potentially bypassing 
national (government level) institutions and lobbying EU policy-makers directly 
(Allen, 2004). Fourth, employment actors may contest regulations or labour 
market rules in pursuit of their own ideological preferences (Edwards and 
Wajcman, 2005; Hancher and Moran, 1989). In assessing if the I&C Directive has 
led employers to involve employees (or unions) in decision-making relates also to 
the ideological preferences of managers to share or control power. This means 
that regulatory space is both a politicised and power-centred construct. The 
greater the space colonized by one employment actor, then the greater the 




Viewing governance of work and employment in such multi-dimensional ways 
requires analyzing exchange of power between institutions and actors. In assessing 
the impact of the I&C Directive on whether employers share decision-making, 
unwrapping different layers of power is vital. Analysis of power, articulated by 
Lukes (1974, 2005), has an established pedigree in workplace sociology (Edwards 
and Scullion, 1982; Edwards, 2006; Sisson, 2012). Power, as it relates to work 
relations, is used in two ways at both macro and micro level. The first, ‘power to’, is 
a positive-sum notion directed towards advancing common interests to get things 
done in a productive manner (Haugaard, 2012). Examples might be cooperative 
union-management forums aimed at problem-solving, or managers devolving 
power to create workplace empowerment. In contrast, ‘power over’ is about 
domination and is a zero-sum game where one party wins what the other party 
loses. ‘Power over’ concerns the ability of one party to persuade another party to 
do something they would not otherwise do (Haugaard, 2012). Both ‘power to’ and 
‘power over’ infer the use and deployment of resources between key actors. For 
example, to obtain a wage employees have to labour under the directed rules and 
authority of an employer whom, typically, has greater access to resources than 
individual workers (Sisson, 2012:177-183). Thus the employer’s ‘power over’ an 
employee usually means they can mobilize a greater range of resources to enforce 
a given preference, and hence the notion of regulatory space proves useful to 
conceptualise this as a zero-sum power approach. The result is that regulation of 
employment is typically unequal, with a structural inequity of resource allocation 




Table 1 advances a simple schematic to integrate Lukes (1974, 2005) three 
dimensional ‘faces’ of power with the concept of how employment actors can 
occupy regulatory space at macro and micro levels. Using Dahl’s (1961) 
organisational decision-making approach, Lukes’s first face of power is about 
observable domination and occurs when one party has the power to secure its 
aims over another. Open and transparent distributive bargaining is one notable 
example. However it is the other less obvious two faces of power which resonate 
to the tactics used to occupy regulatory space considered in this article.   
 
The second approach has its roots in Bachrach and Baratz’s (1970) ‘non decision-
making’ power, explaining how actors prevent certain issues being discussed in the 
first place, or prevent decisions about them being taken. An example is political 
lobbying by employers at a transnational level which can subsequently dilute 
employment legislation at lower (workplace) levels. Sisson (2012:186) illustrates 
this dimension of power by distinguishing two types of employee consultation: 
‘decision-based’ and ‘option-based’. With ‘decision-based’ consultation 
management considers various options for restructuring, makes its preferred 
decision, and then consults employee representatives on how to proceed with a 
decision already made. With ‘option-based’ consultation management presents a 
range of restructuring options, and then employees (or their representatives) are 
invited to discuss alternative preferences with a view to reaching agreement. 
While management makes the final decision in both instances, employee 
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representatives have more voice under ‘option-based’ consultation to influence 
employment regulation.   
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The third face is ideological power. Although not without critique (Edwards, 2006), 
this is the least observable and concerns the power to shape and manipulate 
peoples’ preferences. Lukes argues that ideological power was overarching and 
effectively shaped and placed constraints on the first and second faces of power. In 
employment, ideological power can ensure that employees accept or desire 
management-led practices that may be contrary to their own interests. Examples 
include various corporate culture or quality management initiatives that espouse 
the virtues of empowerment as a source of influencing employee attitudes to win 
their ‘hearts and minds’ (Willmott, 1993). Managerial claims about seeking to 
satisfy the so-called psychological contract for employees may be viewed as an 
ideological form of employer control and manipulation (Cullinane and Dundon, 
2006). Sisson (2012:187) likens ideological power to Walton and McKenzie’s (1965) 
use of ‘attitudinal structuring’ during bargaining and consultation interactions. For 
example information and consultation are processes that influence employee 
expectations and outcomes. Communicative dialogue may be a source of power by 
limiting worker perceptions of what they might gain from management during a 
consultative or bargaining interaction. Thus by manipulating worker attitudes as to 
what may be legitimate or common knowledge, managers can promote 
communication channels as some sort of de facto consultative voice systems, 
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implying a degree of power-sharing that is in reality constrained. Beyond the 
workplace, a similar continuous discourse promulgated by many employers and 
politicians depicting the role of employment regulation as not interfering with 
management’s right to manage has gained ideological currency across neo-liberal 
economies, which similarly shapes attitudes and expectations at other socio-
political levels of state regulation (McDonough and Dundon, 2010).  
 
By integrating faces of power with mechanisms that may be deployed to regulate 
employee voice, this research unpicks factors influencing both the determination 
and the transposition of the I&C Directive. In doing so, the research asks what 
impact the Directive may have had in encouraging employers to share decision-
making powers with workers or their representatives to facilitate ‘power to’ and 
advance common interests.  
 
3. Regulation of I&C: voluntarism and light touch labour law   
The ability of employment actors to mobilise ‘power to’ or ‘power over’ employee 
voice depends on context. In particular, the legal setting is especially important for 
establishing parameters within which power is exercised by one party over another. 
Historically, governments have intervened to import a semblance of counter-
veiling power in employment relations and, indeed, a prime purpose of legal 
regulation was protecting employees against laissez-faire capitalism and its power 
asymmetries. However, discourse about the purpose of such employment 
regulation has changed significantly (Dobbins, 2010). Growing emphasis on market 
liberalization and HRM practices has coincided with reassessment by the state (at 
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EU and national level) of the purpose of legal regulation (Martinez-Lucio and 
MacKenzie, 2004). This reassessment of regulatory purpose can now be partly 
interpreted as a means of employer protection against collectively organized 
employees, rather than the other way round (Donaghey et al, 2011). EU-led 
regulations have gravitated from hard or protective laws (such as equal pay and 
health & safety) towards ‘softer’ light touch measures allowing member states 
greater latitude to transpose arrangements fitting national cultures (Gold, 2009; 
Hall et al., 2011). What distinguishes emerging EU social policy is its ‘low capacity 
to impose binding obligations on market participants, and the high degree to which 
it depends on various kinds of voluntarism ... in the name of self-regulation’ 
(Streeck, 1995: 45-49). This has provided employers with greater latitude in 
shaping their ‘preferred mode of intervention’ (Barnard and Deakin 2000: 341). 
Indeed, light touch regulation, combined with the unitarist advance of HRM, makes 
it easier for employers to shape practice and determine policy options for and on 
behalf of workers (Thompson, 2011).  
 
The impact of the transposed I&C Directive on employer decision-making powers 
remains an important and neglected issue. Both the UK and Irish governments 
transposed the Directive in a way that reflected variation in national custom (Hall 
et al., 2011). In Ireland, the overriding concern was to avoid legislation that 
favoured mandatory collective voice systems which might jeopardize inward 
investment from (non-union) US multinationals (Lavelle et al., 2010). The ICE 
Regulations (2004) in the UK, effective in Northern Ireland in 2005, and the 
Employees (Provision of Information and Consultation) Act (2006) in Ireland 
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broadly constitute light-touch mandates. The implication is that the state 
effectively favoured individualised arrangements over harder statutory provisions 
for collective representative participation that might have encouraged stronger 
power-sharing collaborations (Dundon et al, 2006). Extant empirical evidence five 
years after the transposition of I&C regulations indicates that management 
dominate I&C provisions and control the agenda (Hall et al., 2011).     
 
The transposed regulations in both jurisdictions differ substantially from the 
Directive itself, in that direct (individualised) I&C is encouraged despite the 
Directive explicitly favouring indirect (collective) dialogue via ‘employee 
representatives’ (Donaghey et al 2012). The UK and Irish legislation is broadly, but 
not wholly, similar. In both countries employers need take no action unless 10% of 
their employees actively ‘trigger’ statutory procedures to request an information 
and consultation forum; in Ireland this is capped at 100 employees and 2500 in the 
UK. Even then, voluntary ‘pre-existing’ arrangements can continue if the employer 
can show employees (or unions) are agreeable. To this end, there is considerable 
scope for employers to establish organisation-specific I&C arrangements, including 
direct communication and non-union employee representative (NER) systems 
(Cullinane et al, 2012). In sum, the Directive’s transposition is fraught with 
contestation and lack of clarity between national level laws and intended 
European-wide regulations.     
 
4. Research Methods: Macro and Micro-Level Integration  
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The rationale for data collection in both the Republic of Ireland (ROI) and Northern 
Ireland (UK) is important. The cases are comprised from multi-site organizations 
that operate I&C practices in sites covering both jurisdictions; thereby offering a 
comparative unit of analysis. The ROI and UK are similar open liberalized 
economies, although differ in some notable ways regarding employment 
regulation (Dundon and Collings, 2011). In Ireland there is an explicit reference to 
trade union involvement in a new I&C forum where unions exist, which is not the 
same in the UK. However in ROI there is no statutory trade union recognition 
legislation, unlike the UK. 
 
The research approach integrates macro and micro level analysis across each 
jurisdiction, rather than looking at each separately. At the macro-level 127 public 
documents were obtained using Freedom of Information (FoI) legislations: 122 
obtained from the ROI government; 5 from the Employment Department in 
Northern Ireland, in addition to the UK tripartite agreement between the CBI, TUC 
and government concerning transposed ICE regulations. At micro-level, three 
qualitative workplace case studies were conducted at companies with operations 
in both jurisdictions. Taken together, this presents an integrated analysis of how 
employment regulation was shaped across transnational, national and local 
workplace spaces. 
 
The content analysis of documentary material involved a specific ex post facto 
procedure, following Cohen et al (2000:206). The first step was to acquire official 
documents about the I&C Directive and its policy determination. In ROI 149 
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documents were reported to be relevant by government officials. Of these, access 
to 122 was given: 43 were provided in full while 79 were partially granted with 
sections or words censored by civil servants. Access to 27 documents was refused. 
In the UK all 5 submissions made to the Northern Ireland Employment Department, 
along with the aforementioned tripartite ICE agreement, were all scrutinised using 
content analysis. The second stage involved document coding according to key 
themes: for example articulated employer, union or government preferences. 
Attention was paid concerning employer type: whether a multi-national or 
indigenous firm for example. The third step involved searching for local, national or 
transnational implications as a result of I&C policy preferences previously coded. 
Fourth, documents were searched for possible influences on the content of the 
I&C Directive along with articulated concerns about transposition issues according 
to actor type and jurisdiction. Finally, categories and sub-categories indicating 
opposition or favouritism towards employment regulation were examined.   
 
Following the above, comparable micro level data collection and analysis examined 
the impact of I&C regulations at workplace level in three case studies. The cases 
also represented different sectors of economic activity: manufacturing 
(ConcreteCo), services (BritCo) and retail (RetailCo). The cross-border, multi-sector 
approach provides scope for both ‘between’ and ‘within’ sector and jurisdictional 
comparisons. Further selection criterion was premised on achieving a mix of 
companies with union and non-union practices adopted or re-evaluated 
specifically because of the I&C Directive. A total of 64 interviews at 10 separate 
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5. Findings  
5a: I&C and Regulatory Space at Government Level: 
Macro-level evidence shows two related patterns of influence on occupancy of I&C 
regulations. The first relates to processes of politicised negotiation affecting 
content of the I&C Directive, and the second concerns transposition issues relative 
to the national laws enacted in each jurisdiction. 
 
Activity influencing the content of the I&C Directive occurred in both jurisdictions. 
In the UK, and for the first time, a tripartite agreement was struck between the UK 
Government, CBI and the TUC concerning transposed regulations. Such an 
agreement is significant in its own right and relates to Lukes’s first face of power, 
evident through public and observable negotiation that led to the content of the 
ICE (2004) Regulations. In Ireland, however, political lobbying sought to limit the 
content of institutional regulation by influencing the agenda for I&C, reflecting 
Lukes’s second face of power. For example, evidence shows that civil servants held 
exclusive meetings with employer associations concerning the detail of the I&C 
Directive (e.g. Irish Business and Employers Confederation, IBEC; US Chamber of 
Commerce, AmCham; and the Irish Management Institute, IMI) (DETE 2001c,d; 
AmCham, 2001). IBEC sought to preserve non-statutory arrangements surrounding 
union recognition in ROI, expressing its concern that the Directive ‘may lead to 
trade union recognition by the back door’ (DETE undated). In a note circulated by 
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the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) (1998), governmental opposition to the 
I&C Directive at EU level was based on supporting business and foreign investment 
concerns: 
 
[The Directive would] …. restrict business in making the crucial and speedy 
decisions that are required in today’s competitive market; cut across the 
HRM practices of Irish operations of US multi-nationals and thus damage 
FDI  
(DFA, 1998)  
 
Overarching the second and into the third dimension of power, employer 
preferences articulated flexible market demands as important content elements in 
the Directive. This shows hegemonic values reified into market-driven behaviours 
at subsequent lower levels. For example, the US multinational company Intel met 
the relevant government Minister and DETE officials on several occasions to lobby 
for amendments to the I&C Directive, reflected in a document entitled ‘Elements 
of the Draft Directive which must be changed’. Intel summarized their distinct 
unitarist preferences as follows: 
The insistence of communicating and consulting with employee 
representatives rather than with employees fosters an opposition, ‘them 
versus us’ culture, which is the hallmark of the old and discredited conflict 
based industrial relations model …. requiring the nullifying of company 
decisions is a further draconian step which simply drives business to 
conclude that creating employment in the EU is to be avoided at all costs 
because the consequent risks far outweigh any benefits (Intel, 2000). 
 
Further politicised negotiation by the government sought to influence the content 
of the I&C Directive to reflect business interests. In a briefing note to the Minister 
for Enterprise Trade and Employment (DETE), it is observed that ‘during 
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March/April we had secured key concessions’ prior to the enactment of the 
Directive at a Social Affairs Council meeting on 11th June 2001 (DETE, 2001b). 
Subsequent alterations of the I&C Directive evidently favoured employers and not 
workers or unions: 
 
The requirement for enterprises to report on the ‘probable economic and 
financial situation’ of the enterprise has been replaced by ‘probable 
economic situation’ only. This reduces the level of financial reporting 
obligations in the Directive.  
(DETE, 2001a)  
 
Relating to the second macro-level pattern, transposition of the regulations by 
government, the public consultation exercise allowed interested parties to offer 
their interpretation of how the I&C Directive should be transposed. Various 
employer bodies sought to protect small businesses by insisting that the 
regulations be restricted to organisations employing more than 50 staff (Hall et al., 
2011). In addition, employees have to actively ‘trigger’ their rights; something that 
can be extremely risky for unorganised and non-union workers who might fear 
employer reprisals (Dundon and Gollan, 2007). In the UK employer groups such as 
the CBI and CIPD lobbied government to ensure their preferences were reflected in 
the transposed regulations (Hall, 2011). For example, while signing the agreement 
with the TUC, the CBI actively opposed the principle of ‘collective’ worker rights 
contained in the I&C Directive (CBI, 2003); in a manner akin to Lukes’s first 
observable public face of power. However a neglected aspect of power 
mobilisation in this regard is the role of informal dialogue in shaping attitudes, 
linking into the second face of power. In Ireland the DETE observed that it would 
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‘not help the partnership process’ if the extent of government and employer 
opposition to the Directive was publicly known (DETE, 1998), thereby seeking to 
obscure the ‘hidden’ level of collaboration (collusion) between the state and 
employer bodies, with unions excluded.  
 
In summary, in both jurisdictions employers appear to have gained by 
marginalising collective worker rights and ideologically legitimising direct 
communication as part of the I&C content and its transposed national-level 
regulation. Trade unions, meanwhile, vacated their ‘power to’ influence the space 
by viewing the issue with relative disinterest or uncertainty. Relative to unions 
employers have been strategically organised and pro-active in relation to: a) 
influencing content of the I&C Directive at EU level, and b), setting the agenda for 
transposition arrangements when enacted into national regulation. However, the 
extent to which this ‘power over’ regulatory space for I&C at the macro-level has 
been diffused into workplace micro-level practices and preferences remains an 
empirical issue, which is reported next.  
 
5b: I&C and Regulatory Space at Firm Level 
The way worker voice was regulated in the three case organizations reflected 
variation in deployment of multiple power resources (see table 3). Importantly, 
processes of social formation concerning the I&C regulations at macro-level, as 
reported above, underpinned diffusion of  knowledge and ideological assumptions 
at the micro-level that can be seen to be inter-subjective. That is to say many local 
managers assumed, as objective fact, that the I&C regulations promoted 
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continuation of flexible information-sharing arrangements for voice because these 
attitudes were structured by employer associations and government at national 
and EU levels. Processes of common knowledge formation in each case and the 
linkage to power resources, where evident, are outlined next.    
 
BritCo: employees contest managerial occupation of voice in ROI 
Evidence from BritCo illustrates the importance of countervailing collective power 
which mediated employer occupation of I&C space at workplace level. A group of 
union members in the ROI mobilized to contest management’s preference for non-
union employee representation (NER) arrangements by instigating a union 
recognition campaign. BritCo has dual I&C arrangements that are union-based in 
NI and non-union in ROI. Management responded to the union organising 
campaign in ROI by re-constituting a previously defunct NER staff forum (BritCo 
Vocal). At the same time, BritCo Vocal was used to promote a new approach to 
employee representation because of the I&C Directive. As a result NER 
representatives were elected, the HR Director would outline company 
developments to Vocal representatives, followed by an economic update by the 
Chief Executive and meeting agendas publicly promoted employee concerns. In 
terms of the first observable face of power, NER representatives achieved some 
negotiated gains from management through the newly constituted Vocal forum, 
specifically concerning parity of redundancy terms. Reflecting the second 
dimension of power, the revamped arrangement did more than ‘comply’ with 
external I&C regulations: it also staved off a union recognition drive and embedded 
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managerial preferences for non-union I&C in ROI. In effect, BritCo management 
consciously sought occupation of regulatory space for voice by excluding unions 
and maximising non-union channels.  
 
However the recast Vocal forum was only partially successful. Many employee 
respondents felt the non-union forum degenerated into an ineffective ‘talking-
shop’, more appropriate to ‘tea and toilet’ issues than substantive ‘option-based’ 
consultation with a view to reaching agreement. Significantly, once the union 
recognition drive subsided in ROI, the range of issues on which employees could 
engage with management waned and the desire among employees for union voice 
had not diminished: 
Some employees see it (non-union forum) as management paying lip 
service. Because we have no union, we have no power...There is a whole 
culture amongst employees that we should be unionised. (Employee 
Representative, ROI) 
 
At the same time, exercise of the first and third faces of power took place 
within an ideology of where management used direct communication and 
promoted unions as ‘external influences’, as a means of mobilising bias away 
from employee desire for union representation towards the in-house non-
union representation forum.  
 
Retail Co.: occupying regulatory space through culture and attitudinal manipulation  
RetailCo prides itself on being a ‘good’ non-union employer that supports its 
workforce through psychological engagement. The company does not recognise 
unions anywhere in Ireland or the UK and operates the same non-union I&C 
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structures in both jurisdictions. The company offers an attractive employment 
package including above market pay rates and extensive training and employee 
engagement. The I&C centrepiece is known as ‘Bottom-Up’; an NER committee 
covering store, regional and divisional  levels. To some extent RetailCo 
management would view power as a positive-sum concept expressed through 
empowerment and inclusion, rather than domination or ‘power over’ employees. 
The overarching approach signifies a paternalistic-type culture by supporting 
individual employee engagement rather than collective union bargaining. For 
example:   
From its inception it has never been really explicit…we don’t deal with 
trade unions … We engage with employees and we operate a culture 
where we hope employees would not feel the need for joining unions 
(Manager).  
 
The processes by which management occupied regulatory space at RetailCo 
symbolises less transparent dimensions of Lukes’s second and third faces of power 
and combined both dominant and positive assumptions of power resource 
mobilisation - evident in its subtle if somewhat strategic union avoidance approach. 
The non-union employee committee, Bottom-Up, was revised in 2002 with a 
preference for I&C without union interference. The passing of the I&C Directive in 
the same year was a catalyst for management to review voice arrangements. 
However, desire to comply with external regulation was perhaps a less significant 
factor than management’s primary objective to support and engender positive 
employee attitudes that reflected a unitarist union-free culture. In revising I&C 
arrangements, each retail site has one representative for every fifty employees, 
and meetings normally consist of 5 people: site manager, HR executive, another 
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manager, and 2 employee representatives. In the two stores visited, Bottom-Up 
meetings were meant to occur four times a year but happened only twice. In part, 
management shaped the space for I&C by influencing both the agenda and 
sequence of meetings. With regard to Lukes’s second face of power, management 
allowed employees to suggest agenda items for the Bottom Up forum, but retained 
ultimate control as to when and what issues made it to the actual meeting agenda. 
This equates to what Sisson (2012) calls ‘decision-based’ consultation. 
 
The third face of power was to some extent evident in processes used to shape a 
distinctive corporate culture at RetailCo. The revised ‘Bottom Up’ structure 
combined also with an ideological value for individual employee engagement 
which enabled management to affect change compatible with their own rather 
than employee preferences. For example, reservations about the utility of Bottom 
Up were expressed by line managers: ‘it’s not utilised properly…and it has become 
negative…a venting exercise’. Employees viewed the forum as shallow: ‘something 
that’s not really taken seriously by management’. A non-union representative 
described a problem with excess heat that had been raised at all levels, although 
management refrained from acting until the Health and Safety Inspectorate issued 
the company with an enforcement notice.   
 
ConcreteCo: dual voice in cross-border jurisdictional space 
At ConcreteCo there was duality in terms of how processes of social formation 
related to Lukes’s dimensions of power across the two jurisdictions of ROI 
(unionised) and NI/UK (non-union). Importantly, preferences that I&C regulations 
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need to be cognisant of business interests were strongly advocated by managers. 
In part this concurs with Lukes’s first dimension of power, in that employers openly 
dominated space for I&C at workplace level. In NI, management simply refused to 
consult workers and viewed I&C regulations to be at best irksome, at worst an 
intrusion on managers’ right to manage: 
 
I think the word ‘consultation’ is a misnomer, it is very much 
communication…. Consultation implies there is a party with 
information, there is an opportunity to give feedback on that 
information, the feedback is listened to, and as a result decisions 
are taken. That does not happen here (HR Manager, NI).  
 
The unilateral decision not to consult or involve workers was confirmed by other 
employees and managers. Some NI employees expressed dissatisfaction and 
wanted more opportunity to ‘have a say and get feedback’. However management 
control circumvented the limited rights employees had regarding consultation. For 
instance, an administration manager was the ‘nominated’ employee 
representative for the European Works Council (EWC). In doing this management 
could screen out potential issues and control the I&C agenda, reflecting the second 
face of power mobilisation. Similar power utilisation was evident in ConcreteCo 
sites in ROI, although in different ways. Rather than the managerial unilateralism 
evident in NI, unions occupied elements of regulatory space in ROI owing to long-
standing multi-union bargaining and consultation: something the senior HR 
manager called a ‘good system of information and consultation’. In this regard, 
employees saw the visible role of adversarial union bargaining as an effective 
channel for regulating voice. At the same time, management often presented 
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decisions as a fait accompli in collective forums, and thereby restricted power-
sharing. In short, the second face of power meant that ‘decision-based’ rather than 
‘option-based’ consultative arrangements emerged in reality. For example: 
You get the sense that decisions are already made at a higher level, 
then the unions are told. Unions don’t have real influence, say if new 
machinery or work practices come in. There is no real participation. 
(Union Steward, ROI) 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Integrating multiple evidence and predicting cause and effect is always 
problematic in sociological analysis, and it is not the intention here to offer such 
predicative causality between multiple processes affecting the regulatory space of 
the I&C Directive. However, there are a number of evident patterns in terms of 
preferences articulated by employment relations actors within and across multiple 
levels of analysis. Such a multi-level and multi-dimensional focus is important in 
helping to understand how social processes of regulatory formation and 
transposition are mediated and manipulated, often using direct but also more 
subtle forms of power and persuasion. The theoretical schematic in Table 1 earlier 
is reproduced below in Table 3, this time summarising key findings for each level, 
power dimension, and links to I&C practices. In so doing, it illustrates macro-micro 
interaction and linkages.   
 
TABLE 3 HERE  
 
The contribution of this multi-level framework is to show how both employers and 
the state in the LME contexts of ROI and UK (NI) have shaped the macro-level 
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processes of the I&C Directive to reinforce preferences for voluntarism and 
employer ‘power over’ workplace decisions. The outcome of this - illustrated by 
linkages to the micro case studies - has been to exclude workers from shared 
decision-making about aspects of workplace governance, that the Directive initially 
intended. The potential for the Directive to act as a spur towards the positive uses 
of ‘power to’ empower workforce decision-making has not materialized. The ICE 
Regulations (2004) in the UK and I&C Act (2006) in Ireland provide an insufficient 
legislative counterweight to shift the power balance in workplace governance from 
employer dominated ‘power over’ to more positive collaborative mutuality.   
 
The article suggests that a schematic multi-layered governance framework of 
regulatory space serves as a useful integrated analytical tool (see Table 1) for 
understanding variable impacts of policy formation and transposition of the I&C 
Directive across transnational, national and enterprise levels (see Table 3). In this 
way, the contribution adds something to Lukes’s three faces of power. The concept 
of power, as Edwards (2006:573) argues, remains a ‘necessary element’ when 
seeking to understand institutions regulating work and it is possible to extend 
Lukes’s analysis of the multiple dimensions of power when examining processes of 
regulatory space. To this end the article addresses some missing pieces in Lukes’s 
work by analysing the nuances of ideological power, the distinction between 
‘power over’ as domination and ‘power to’ get things done for productive ends, 
empirically connecting the dynamics of how work relations shape power relations 
across macro and micro-levels. The data also exposes inherent problems with 
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Lukes’s third face of power given the ambiguity of capturing ideological intent and 
preference-seeking behaviours.    
   
In terms of regulatory effects, the evidence pointed to a pattern of space 
occupation that favoured employer over worker interests in two ways. Firstly, 
direct influences on the ‘content’ of the I&C Directive. Secondly, political dialogue 
that affected the ‘transposition’ arrangements for national regulation which 
embedded a sharing of common-knowledge formation among employers and 
employer associations promoting the dominance of voluntarism and employer 
choice over voice options. While union actors were not found to be weak or 
powerless per se, they did lack the capacity to establish a more collectivist voice 
regime serving their members’ long-term interests relative to those of employer 
bodies; especially for lobbying in the political sphere. Significantly, unions in the UK 
and ROI have long been ambivalent and defensive about I&C rights, tending to 
view them as a possible threat to traditional collective bargaining. Accordingly 
unions did not mobilize to affect either content or transposition arrangements of 
the I&C Directive and were unable to challenge a prevailing employer (ideological) 
orthodoxy. In view of this, employers displayed a more effective (efficient) capacity 
to mobilize ‘power over’ an emerging and evolving regulatory space affecting 
workplace governance powers. Notably, in relation to the less observable third 
power face, a continuous and seemingly omnipresent discourse was promulgated 
by many employers (and policy-makers) that employment regulation should not 




Therefore, the I&C Directive has not prompted a new politics of 'common 
knowledge' formation between employers and unions based on robust 
representative consultation. Rather employers, facilitated by the state, legitimised 
an ideological mind-set that primarily promoted direct employee communications 
as policy content, even though the Directive itself was framed to embed a more 
collectivist element to workforce consultation and shared decision-making. 
Employer domination over the regulatory space of I&C has lubricated an 
ideological preference for voluntarism across neo-liberal market regimes – in line 
with Lukes’s third ‘face’ of power. In Ireland, especially, US multinational 
companies and their representative associations have exerted considerable 
ideological power over the content and transposition of the I&C Directive. In so 
doing, employers not only asserted strong lobbying pressure on the national 
government (indeed, there was ideological collusion between the state and big 
business to ensure the I&C Directive did not intrude on managerial prerogative), 
but also bypassed national institutions in influencing European social policy makers 
directly.  
 
The macro context had implications for events at micro-level, evident in the case 
organizations (examples in Table 3). Macro-level preferences for laissez faire 
voluntarism associated with the third face of power, union ambivalence, and 
subsequent minimal transposition of the I&C Directive, meant national regulations 
had little impact in the case organizations in encouraging employers to share 
decision-making powers for productive ends (‘power to’) through new or revised 
consultation mechanisms; as originally intended by the Directive. Rather, 
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employers at micro-level tended to occupy regulatory space for I&C governance by 
utilizing ‘power over’ domination. This was evident by influencing workforce 
expectations and attitudes that legitimised as normal weaker ‘decision-based’ 
information rather than more robust ‘option-based’ consultation arrangements 
(Sisson, 2012:186-87). To this end shaping attitudes and worker expectations 
about what management might deliver on joint workplace governance was a 
power resource for employer occupancy of regulatory space. Many local managers 
assumed as inter-subjective objective knowledge (Culpepper, 2008) that direct 
communications and/or ‘decision-based’ consultation were acceptable and the 
preferential mode to regulate I&C. This meant I&C regulations did not prompt a 
politics of new common knowledge formation around robust representative social 
dialogue at micro level. 
 
Importantly, the multiple power dimensions articulated by Lukes were not 
exclusive but tended to co-exist as resources for employer colonization of 
regulatory space at micro-level. The overlapping faces of power and employer 
capture of regulatory space for voice were more complete in some cases than 
others. There were important differences relating to context-specific factors 
affecting power to regulate I&C; notably the presence of unionized workers and 
their capacity to contest management preferences. The most robust forms of I&C 
were evident in highly unionized BritCo (NI), and shallow in non-union ConcreteCo 
(NI). In workplaces where unions were not recognized, employer’s deployed non-
union voice mechanisms to avoid unions. At BritCo (ROI) all three faces of power 
were in play, as union members mobilised collectively to pursue union recognition 
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rights and, thereby, opposed the management sponsored non-union forum. While 
this collective counter-mobilization did not mean employees achieved union 
recognition, they did set certain limits to employer capture of regulatory space 
that unorganized workers would be less able to achieve. In RetailCo, management 
had an ideological agenda to win employee ‘hearts and minds’ by using corporate 
culture by espousing non-union relational values over unionised structures. This 
did not fully translate into dominatorary ‘power over’ within Lukes framework, but 
instead reflected elements of positive ‘power to’ emancipate employees at 
RetailCo with strong ideological undercurrents of paternalism. 
 
To conclude, this article makes an important contribution to the processes of 
common knowledge formation as sources of power mobilisation affecting 
occupation of employment regulation. It integrates the concept of ‘regulatory 
space’ with Lukes ‘faces’ of power to provide a schematic integrated macro-micro 
analytical framework to better understand how employment regulation impacts 
across transnational, national and enterprise levels. The research addresses some 
gaps in Lukes theory by analyzing the nuances of ideological power, the distinction 
between ‘power over’ as domination and ‘power to’. It also shows, however, there 
are limits to Lukes (1974, 2005) categorisation of ideological power at the micro-
levels given its ambiguous dynamic. By capturing regulatory space for I&C, 
employers have preserved and even reinforced voluntary modes of regulation in 
the work and employment sphere, while excluding workers from shared decision-
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Table 1: Integrating regulatory space and the mobilisation of power in employment relations 
Theorising ‘regulatory 
space’ 
Lukes’s three ‘faces’ of 
power defined 
Mechanisms/social processes 
used to mobilise power in 
regulating employment space 
 Space is available to be 
occupied 
 Shifting frontiers of control 
 
First Face:  
 Open decision-making processes 
 Observable use of power to 
dominate 
 Collective bargaining/Partnership 
 Individual negotiation 
 One-way communication channels 
 Unequal distribution of 
resource allocation 
 Institutional constraints 
 Multi-level and Multi-
dimensional 
 
Second Face:  
 Closed decision-making 
processes 
 Prevent issues being discussed or 
decision taken 
 Political lobbying (overt and covert) 
 Decision-based information 
mechanisms (e.g. NER voice) 
 Voluntary pre-existing I&C 
agreements 
 Multi-level and Multi-
dimensional 
 Ideological preference-setting 
 Politicised and power-centred 
Third Face:  
 Least observable use of power 
 Attitudinal structuring 
 Agenda-setting issues for consultation 
 Corporate culture 








Table 2: Case Study Organisations and Interviews 
Case Sector Sites NI Sites ROI Respondents 
BritCo Services 1 2 Interviews: 6 managers, 3 union reps, 4 non-
union reps, 13 employees, n=26 
RetailCo Retail 1 2 Interviews: 2 HR managers, 6 employee 
reps, 10 employees, n=18 
ConcreteCo Manufacture 1 3 Interviews: 8 managers, 3 union reps, 1 EWC 
rep, 8 employees, n=20 








Table 3: Integrating multi-level power, regulation and I&C practices 
Regulatory space occupied Lukes’s faces of 
power 
Examples of reported social processes, mechanism 
and I&C practices 
Macro-level findings 
Content of the I&C Directive 1st face Negotiated tripartite agreement (UK only) 
2nd face Employers lobbying government to promote business 
interests (UK and ROI) 
3rd face Ideological values to limit collective I&C in favour of 
direct mechanism (UK and ROI) 
Transposition of national 
(domestic) regulation 
1st face Public consultation and submitted actor preferences on 
transposition regulations (UK and ROI)  
2nd face Persuasion to support individual over collective I&C 
practices in transposed national regulations (UK and 
ROI) 
3rd face Ideological collusion between state and employers (ROI 
only) to exclude unions. 
Micro-level findings 
BritCo 1st face Blatant refusal to recognise unions (ROI only) 
2nd face Promote alternative NER arrangement to union 
consultation in ROI, while bargaining with unions in NI 
3rd face Partial evidence of 3rd face found: ideology of non-
unionism (ROI) 
RetailCo 1st face Little or no direct evidence found of 1st face 
2nd face Bottom-Up NER forum as alternative to collective (union) 
voice (NI and ROI) 
3rd face Ideological values / culture of non-union employee 
engagement (NI and ROI) (positive-sum paternalism) 
ConcreteCo 1st face Unilateral management decision-making contrary to 
external/ICE regulations (NI only) 
2nd face Limited or no direct evidence found of 2nd face 
3rd face fait accompli decision-based consultation arrangements 
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